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I.

INTRODUCTION

This appeal involves two separate and distinct legal issues:

transmutation of real

property and valid delivery of a deed. In his opening brief, Jack argued that the District Court
committed error on both issues by applying the incorrect legal standards and relying on evidence
that was legally and logically irrelevant if the correct legal standards had been applied. Jack also
argued that there was not substantial and competent evidence to support several of the facts
found by the District Court.
Thelma's responsive brief argued, almost exclusively, that none of the evidence
presented at trial was controverted and, accordingly, this Court should simply defer to the
District Court's decision. While much of the evidence presented at trial was uncontroverted, this
appeal is not about evidentiary issues; it is about legal issues. Specifically, whether the correct
standards of law were applied and whether the findings would actually support the District
Court's judgment if the correct standards of law had been applied.
Because the District Court erred on each of these points, it is immaterial whether the
evidence presented was controverted. In the final analysis, the evidence presented and the facts
found simply did not support the judgment entered.

For the reasons that follow, Jack

respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision of the District Court with instructions to
enter an order to partition the Middleton Place.

ll.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The crux of this appeal concerns the intersection of the law and the facts and,
specifically, whether the District Court committed error when applying the facts to the law. In
his opening brief, Jack argued that the District Court committed multiple errors because it
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applied the incorrect standard of law. Because the standards of law applied by the District Court
were incorrect, the findings could not and did not support the judgment.
Thelma's responsive brief argues that this Court should defer to the District Court's
determination that clear and convincing evidence supported its conclusions of law.

See,

generally, Resp. Br. 10-11. This argument misses a critical step. While the District Court's

findings are entitled to significant deference, this Court has greater leeway when considering
whether the findings actually support correct legal standards.
Unlike review of whether substantial and competent evidence supports findings of fact,
this Court may exercise free review over the District Court's application of those findings to the
correct legal standard: "[T]his court may substitute its view for that of the district court on a
legal issue." Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975, 979 (1997) (citing Standards
of Appellate Review in State and Federal Courts, IDAHO APPELLATE HANDBOOK, Section 4.2
(1996»;

see also Kraly v. Kraly, 147 Idaho 299, 303, 208 P.3d 281, 285 (2009) ("The

characterization of [real property] in light of the facts found, however, is a question of law over
which this Court exercises free review."). Accordingly, when determining whether the District
Court properly applied its findings to the law, this Court may exercise free review. Marshall,
130 Idaho at 679-80,946 P.2d at 979-80; see also Ustick v. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215, 221, 657 P.2d
1083, 1089 (Ct. App. 1983) (noting that the reviewing court can determine the legal nature of
transactions, so long as doing so does not require it to weigh evidence, resolve conflicts in the
evidence, draw inferences from the evidence, form an opinion as to the credibility of witnesses
or make factual determinations different from the trial court).
While a handful of findings were not supported by substantial and competent evidence,
these findings address facts that were otherwise irrelevant as a matter of law. Because the
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present appeal asks this Court to (i) review the legal standards applied by the District Court and
(ii) apply the District Court's findings to the correct legal standards, all matters presented for

review are questions of law over which this Court exercises free review.
III.

ARGUMENT

First, the District Court applied the incorrect legal standards in reaching the conclusion
that the 1990 Quitclaim Deed transmuted Alva's separate property interest in the Middleton
Place into community property. And, because the court applied the incorrect legal standard it
relied on factual findings that were legally and logically irrelevant and do not support the
judgment. Applying the correct legal standard, the District Court's findings do not support a
conclusion that Alva transmuted his separate property interest in the Middleton Place into
community property when he executed the 1990 Quitclaim Deed.

Accordingly, this Court

should reverse the decision of the District Court and remand with instructions to enter an order
that Alva and Thelma held title to the Middleton Place as tenants in common, with their
respective interests characterized as separate property.
Second, the District Court's errors on the issue of delivery are almost a mirror image of
the errors committed on the transmutation issue: The District Court applied the incorrect legal
standard and, in so doing, relied on findings of fact that were legally and logically irrelevant to
support the judgment.

Applying the correct legal standard, the findings do not support a

conclusion that Alva retained dominion or control over the 2006 Quitclaim Deed at the time he
deposited it into escrow. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the decision of the District
Court and remand with instructions to enter an order holding that Alva conveyed his interest in
the Middleton Place to Jack.

Because these two legal conclusions support the request for

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 3

partition prayed for in Jack's complaint, the District Court should be further instructed to enter
an order for partition.

A.

The District Court erred when deciding the transmutation issue by applying
the incorrect legal standard and by relying on legally and logically irrelevant
facts.

The District Court erred in two ways when examining the transmutation issue. First, it
failed to anchor its analysis of transmutation of real property to any statutory formalities. And,
second, because its analysis was not based on statutory formalities, it relied on legally and
logically irrelevant evidence.
1.

Because "intent to transmute" is not anchored to any statutory
authority it is the incorrect legal standard to apply to transmutation
of real property.

Jack and Thelma present two very different interpretations of the legal standard to be
applied when analyzing transmutation of real property. Jack contends that this appeal presents
the opportunity for this Court to clarify the interplay between Titles 32, 55, Idaho Code, and the
parol evidence rule when dealing with transmutation of real property. Thelma contends that the
recent case of Barrett v. Barrett, 149 Idaho 21, 232 P.3d 799 (2010), stands for the proposition
that no statutory formalities are required for the transmutation of real property and this appeal is
nothing more than an attempt to overrule Barrett.
It is well settled under Idaho law that parties may transmute real property only by

complying with statutory formalities. Stockdale v. Stockdale, 102 Idaho 870, 873, 643 P.2d 82,
85 (Ct. App. 1982). Consistent with this well-settled law, Jack has identified three potential
statutory anchors that can be used to reconcile Barrett with Idaho's statutory formalities: Idaho
Code § 32-917, Idaho Code § 55-508, and Idaho Code § 55-104.
On this appeal, Thelma has effectively asked this Court to hold that no statutory
formalities limit relevant parol evidence that may be considered and the only test for
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 4

transmutation of real property under Idaho law is whether the grantor had an "intent to
transmute." Resp. Br. at 12-14. Thelma's characterization of this appeal is correct only if this
Court intended that Barrett overrule thirty years of Idaho precedent prohibiting the informal
transmutation of real property.
Because there is no indication that Barrett was intended to create such sweeping changes
to Idaho's real property and community property laws, because the statutory anchors Jack cited
are consistent with Barrett, and because Thelma offered no legal authority, analysis, or argument
in support of her request to over-turn well settled law, this Court should reject Thelma's overbroad interpretation of Barrett and hold that parol evidence of transmutation of real property
must be anchored in some statutory authority.
a.

Barrett neither expressly nor impliedly held that courts may
ignore the statutory authority of Idaho Code § 55-508 when
characterizing the interests created by a deed executed by and
between spouses.

Idaho Code § 55-508 unambiguously states:
Every interest in real estate granted or devised to two (2) or more
persons ... constitutes a tenancy in common, unless expressly
declared in the grant or devise to be otherwise.

I.e. § 55-508 (emphasis added).
In Barrett, the deed read: "Ann Barrett and Gregory Barrett, Wife and Husband as
Tenants by the Entireties." 149 Idaho at 22, 232 P.3d at 800. Unlike that deed, the 1990
Quitclaim Deed contains no indication or reference to the fact that Alva and Thelma were
married. Because the 1990 Quitclaim Deed does not contain an express declaration that Alva
and Thelma hold the Middleton Place as anything other than tenants in common, in order to even
consider whether title was held as community property, the District Court had to reject the plain
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language of Section 55-508 and rely on extrinsic evidence of the parties' marriage. See App. Br.
at 8.
A rule of law that permits a trial court to rely on extrinsic evidence of marriage solely to
avoid application of Idaho Code § 55-508 would judicially nullify the statute with respect to
every conveyance by and between spouses. Because the deed in Barrett contained an express
declaration that the parties held title as something other than tenants in common, Barrett does not
require that courts ignore Idaho Code § 55-508 when characterizing property interests created by
deeds executed by and between spouses. Accordingly, Jack's request that this Court rely on the
statutory authority of Section 55-508 is not a request for this Court to overrule Barrett. Rather,
his request is consistent with Idaho law requiring that the transmutation of real property follow
statutory formalities.
b.

Barrett neither expressly or impliedly held that courts may
ignore the statutory authority of Idaho Code § 55-104 when
characterizing the interests created by a deed executed by and
between spouses.

Thelma argues that the "intent to transmute" standard articulated in Barrett should not be
restrained by the "acquired as community property" standard of Idaho Code § 55-104, calling
such limitation "overly simplistic, formulaic, and not in line with Idaho case law." Resp. Br. at
13-15. In effect, Thelma argues that Barrett held parties may transmute real property without
complying with any statutory formalities.

Because Barrett did not expressly overturn

longstanding authority and because Thelma has not offered any authority, argument, or analysis
in support of this bold extension of Idaho law, Thelma's interpretation of Barrett should be
rejected. Instead, Barrett should be given an interpretation and application that is consistent with
Idaho statutory authority and Idaho case law.
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Thelma's interpretation of Barrett is based on a concluding sentence which reads "the
determination whether property has been transmuted is a question of fact turning on intent. In
making this factual determination, trial courts are free to consider all relevant evidence
regarding that intent." Barrett, 149 Idaho at 25, 232 P.3d at 803 (emphasis added). After
stripping that statement of the historical context of Winn v. Winn, 105 Idaho 811, 673 P.2d 411
(1983), Thelma argues that a court can consider any and all extrinsic evidence and ignore the
requirement that transmutation of real property comply with statutory formalities.
Conversely, in an effort to read Barrett within the context of the longstanding principal
that transmutation of real property must comply with statutory formalities, Jack cited to Idaho
Code § 55-104 as one of three potential statutory anchors. Jack argued that "relevant evidence"
referenced in Barrett was evidence speaking to the "acquired as community property" standard
of Idaho Code § 55-104. Jack then discussed how each of the six WinniBarrett factors worked
within the timing and funding analysis mandated by Idaho Code §§ 32-903 and 32-906, thereby
satisfYing the statutory formality of Section 55-104. 1 App. Br. at 9-14.
Thelma offered no argument, analysis, or authority in support of her proposition that all
evidence is relevant evidence regarding "intent to transmute," nor has she offered any argument,
analysis, or authority to support her proposition that this Court should shed the requirement that
transmutation of real property must comply with statutory formalities. Avoiding any statutory
restraint on the evidentiary inquiry authorized by the WinniBarrett line of cases would
effectively overturn the long standing rule that transmutation of real property must comply with
statutory formalities. Thus, Thelma's proposed application of Barrett is overbroad and should be

I Jack recognizes that the six WinnlBarrett factors present an illustrative, not exhaustive, list of potentially relevant
evidence. The critical proposition advanced by Jack is that the evidence considered must be relevant to the timing
and funding analysis discussed in Kraly, 147 Idaho at 303, 208 P.3d at 285, and anchored in the statutory authority
ofldaho Code §§ 32-903 and 32-906.
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rejected. Accordingly, Jack respectfully requests that this Court hold that extrinsic evidence
regarding intent to transmute (i.e., evidence speaking to the six WinniBarrett factors) is limited
to the "acquired as community property" standard of Idaho Code § 55-104 and that the District
Court erred by applying the incorrect legal standard.

2.

The District Court's decision must be reversed because its findings of
fact are legally irrelevant when the correct legal standard is applied.

In reaching its conclusion that the 1990 Quitclaim Deed transmuted Alva's separate
property interest in the Middleton Place into community property, the District Court relied on
several facts that are irrelevant as a matter of law. The District Court looked to any and all
evidence of Alva's intent to transmute, instead of the "acquired as community property" standard
ofIdaho Code § 55-104.
As noted in Jack's opening brief, the District Court relied on at least five fmdings of fact
that speak only of Alva's undisclosed, sUbjective intent regarding transmutation: (i) Alva had
previously encumbered the Middleton Property (, 12.1);2 (ii) Alva had encountered financial
difficulty (, 12.2); (iii) Alva and Thelma had previously alienated all other real property owned
by either of them (, 12.3); (iv) Alva and Thelma had a contract for wills and mutually reciprocal
wills (, 12.9); and (v) some alleged fear that John would talk Alva into alienating the property
(, 10).3 App. Br. at 17-18. However, because the correct inquiry is restrained by the "acquired
as community property" standard of Section 55-104, evidence of Alva's undisclosed, subjective
intent to transmute is irrelevant as a matter of law.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law appear in the Record at Volume II, page 239-262. Each paragraph is
separately numbered. Rather than identifYing each paragraph by its full citation to the record, as he did in his
opening brief, Jack will identifY each paragraph as (~, when referring to specific fmdings and conclusions.
3 Jack detailed these facts in his opening brief, showing why each did not apply to the correct legal standard. App.
Sr. at 16-21. In response, Thelma argued only that these facts were uncontroverted. Resp. Sr. at 17-18.
2
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The District Court also supported its conclusion with the finding that Alva and Thelma
retired prior encumbrances with the proceeds of a loan secured by the 1990 mortgage (~ 12.7).4
Thelma has not cited and Jack cannot locate any Idaho authority that stands for the proposition
that using loan proceeds to retire separate property debt has any impact on the characterization of
the asset securing the loan proceeds. Like the other five findings, this particular fact is simply
legally irrelevant to the question of transmutation.

3.

The District Court's decision must be reversed because the findings
that are relevant to the "acquired as community property" standard
of Idaho Code § 55-104 do not logically support the conclusion that
Alva transmuted his interest in the Middleton Place.

In reaching its conclusion that the 1990 Quitclaim Deed transmuted Alva's separate
property interest in the Middleton Place into community property, the District Court did rely on
several facts that are legally relevant under the "acquired as community property" standard of
Idaho Code § 55-104, which guides the WinniBarrett factors. However, because the District
Court did not anchor its characterization of the Middleton Place to the correct legal standard,
these particular findings were misapplied.

When properly applied, these findings do not

logically support the District Court's characterization of the Middleton Place as community
property. Because this Court may exercise free review when applying the facts to the law, it is

4 This portion of the finding in ~ 12.7 is not only legally irrelevant, it is also not supported by substantial and
competent evidence. Jack detailed the evidence in the record, demonstrating that the two original mortgages created
a total encumbrance of $44,000.00 and showing that the proceeds from the sale of 53 acres of the Middleton Place
generated a $75,000.00 purchase price. App. Br. at 18. Jack then noted the absence of any portion of Thelma's
accounting ledger indicating a remaining loan balance on these prior mortgages. App. Br. at 17-18. Thelma
countered this evidence with citation to her testimony that the new mortgage was taken out to retire the earlier
mortgages. Resp. Br. at 14-15 (citing Tr. p. 217, L. 19 - p. 222, L. 2). A review of Thelma's testimony, however,
demonstrates that she testified that the $20,000.00 loan was retired with payments from the sale of the 53 acres
(which were Alva's separate property). Tr. p. 220, L. 23 - p. 221, L. 7. While Thelma's testimony the point that the
prior mortgages were retired using proceeds from the sale of the 53 acres was clear, her testimony as to what the
proceeds from the $20,000 loan were used for is unclear and confused. Tr~ p. 221, L. 8 - p. 222, L. 20.
Accordingly, no reasonable mind could conclude that any portion of the loan proceeds secured by the $20,000.00
1990 mortgage was used to retire the pre-existing debts on the 53 acres.
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within this Court's authority to freely determine the characterization of the Middleton Place
based on the lower court's factual findings.
First, the finding that Alva executed the 1990 Quitclaim Deed to effectuate obtaining a
mortgage on the Middleton Place

(~

12.4) is relevant only in that it opens the door to the

"acquired as community property" standard ofIdaho Code § 55-104 and consideration of the six
WinniBarrett factors. That is to say, because the 1990 Quitclaim Deed may have been associated

with a credit acquisition, a court may consider extrinsic evidence of whether Thelma acquired
her interest as community property. 5 The credit acquisition does not help to establish the
character of the property. Because this finding only opens the door to consideration of the
WinniBarrett factors, it does not support the District Court's characterization of the Middleton

Property as community property.
The District Court also looked to the names on the deed to support its conclusion that
Alva's interest in the Middleton Place was transmuted into community property.

(~12.5).

The

District Court did not, however, correctly apply this factor to the "acquired as community
property" standard of Section 55-104. The 1990 Quitclaim Deed does not expressly state that the
grantees hold their interests as anything other than tenants in common:

Accordingly, the

statutory presumption of Idaho Code § 55-508 applies. Because the deed creates a presumption

During the course of this matter, Thelma has taken manifestly inconsistent positions with respect to whether the
1990 Quitclaim Deed was prepared in connection with a credit acquisition. Currently, for purposes of this appeal,
Thelma argues that the deed was executed during the course of credit acquisition, thereby opening the door for this
Court to consider parol evidence and, more specifically, the six WinniBarrett factors. Resp. Br. at 14-15.
Conversely, at the summary judgment stage and at trial, Thelma rejected any claim that the preparation of the deed
was done in conjunction with a credit acquisition, arguing that the lack of such connection is proof that the couple
intended to transmute Alva's separate property interest into real property. Tr. p. 43, L. 22-p. 45, L. 17; p. 418, L. 3L. 7.
5

Thelma's attempt to ascribe two mutually exclusive meanings to this finding demonstrates how little meaning this
Court should give to this particular factor. Thelma cannot argue that the 1990 Quitclaim Deed was executed during
the course of a refinancing, so parol evidence should be considered, and then argue that the 1990 Quitclaim Deed
had nothing to do with refmancing efforts, so the Court should assume greater intent to transmute than that which is
expressly reflected in the deed. Her argument is internally inconsistent and logically flawed.
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that Alva and Thelma held their interest as tenants in common, this factor suggests only that
additional evidence must be considered to characterize Thelma's tenant in common interest.
The District Court also looked to the names on the mortgage to support its
characterization of the Middleton Place as community property.

(~12.5).

However, under the

facts of this particular case, the names on the mortgage shed no light on whether Thelma
acquired her interest in the Middleton Place as community property.

The 1990 mortgage

includes the names "Alva L. Garrett and Thelma V. Garrett, husband & wife." Def.'s Ex. KK.
While the mortgage provides more information regarding the relationship of Alva and Thelma
than does the 1990 Quitclaim Deed, the "husband & wife" reference does not indicate whether
Thelma acquired her interest as community property or separate property, nor does it indicate
how the bank may have characterized the Middleton Place. Without more, the "husband & wife"
reference lends equal support to either characterization. Accordingly, this particular fact does
not necessarily support the District Court's characterization of the Middleton Place as
community property.
The District Court also relied on its finding that Alva and Thelma co-mingled other
personal property and separate income

(~

12.6) to support its characterization of the Middleton

Place. This particular finding is both legally and logically irrelevant. It is well settled under
Idaho law that parties cannot informally transmute an interest in real property through
co-mingling of funds. See, e.g., Stockdale, 102 Idaho at 873, 643 P.2d at 85. It is, therefore,
logically impossible that co-mingling of personal property assets constitutes relevant evidence of
an informal intent to transmute real property. Accordingly, using the fact of co-mingling of
personal property and separate income as circumstantial evidence that the parties intended to
informally transmute their interest in real property would be improper. App. Br. at 18. Thelma
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did not offer any argument or authority that countered this position, instead noting only that the
evidence was not contradicted. Resp. Br. at 18.
Finally, the District Court relied on the finding that Alva and Thelma used community
funds to pay the indebtedness secured by the 1990 mortgage to support its characterization of the
Middleton Place as community property.

(~12.7). 6

However, under Idaho law, using

community funds to pay the indebtedness secured by separate property collateral does not
change the character of the underlying security. Rather, the reverse is true: Under well-settled
Idaho law, the character of the debt follows the character of the security. Gapsch v. Gapsch, 76
Idaho 44, 55, 227 P.2d 278, 285 (1954). Further, "the character of an item of property as
community or separate vests at the time of its acquisition." Winn, 105 Idaho at 814, 673 P.2d at
414 (citing In re Estate ofFreeburn, 97 Idaho 845, 555 P.2d 385 (1976)).
[P]roperty cannot be converted gradually from community to
separate [or vice versa] by one spouse making payments on a
community debt from his or her separate funds. That would in
effect allow one spouse to "buy" the community property and
thereby unilaterally transmute its character. Such reasoning is
violative of the fundamental of the transmutation doctrine: that the
character of property may be changed by agreement between the
spouses.

Id. at 814, n. 2, 673 P.2d at 414, n. 2 (emphasis in original): Under this authority, the possible
use of approximately $2,000 from an unidentified source 7 to make payments on a note secured

Not only does this fact not support the conclusion reached by the District Court, it is also not supported by
substantial and competent evidence. Thelma was unable to testify as to any payments made out of community funds
towards the indebtedness secured by the 1990 mortgage. App. Br. at 19-20. The entries on the accounting ledger
that could, possibly, be linked to payments by Alva and/or Thelma towards the indebtedness secured by the 1990
mortgage totaled only $2,028.25 in payments towards a $20,000.00 indebtedness. App. Br. at 20. Moreover, there
was no evidence whether these payments were made from Alva's separate property income, Thelma's separate
property income, or any income earned by the community. Because this finding is not supported by substantial and
competent evidence, it must be disregarded.
7 Thelma makes much of the fact that her social security payments were nearly double Alva's, as she argues that the
District Court could have inferred that the bank looked to her income when making its lending decision. Resp. Br.
at 16-17. A review of the findings indicates that the court did not make such an inference. Moreover, even if the
bank had looked to Thelma's social security payments, those are her separate income: Social security payments are
separate property. Winn v. Winn, 101 Idaho 270, 277, n.l, 611 P.2d 1055,1062, n. 1 (1980). Thelma's accounting
6
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by the Middleton Place does not support the District Court's characterization of the Middleton
Place as community property.
B.

The District Court erred when deciding the delivery issue by applying the
incorrect legal standard and by relying on legally and logically irrelevant
facts.

The District Court's errors on the delivery issue mirror the errors committed on the
transmutation issues. To begin, instead of placing the burdens of proof and production on
Thelma to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Alva retained dominion or control
over the 2006 Quitclaim Deed when he delivered it into escrow, the District Court improperly
placed these burdens on Jack to establish that Alva intended to divest himself of title. Because
the District Court looked to the wrong party to prove the incorrect standard of law, its findings
are legally and logically irrelevant and do not support a conclusion that delivery was invalid
when the correct standard of law is applied.
1.

The District Court applied the wrong legal standard on the delivery
issue because it required Jack to prove Alva's intent to divest himself
of title rather than requiring Thelma to prove Alva retained dominion
and control over the deed when he deposited it into escrow.

As discussed in Jack's opening brief, based on the undisputed facts of this case, Jack's
claim of title to the Middleton Place is supported by two legal presumptions: (i) he has title to the
property based on the duly recorded 2006 Quitclaim Deed and (ii) the duly recorded deed was
ledger clearly delineated which portion of the funds on deposit in the couple's joint accounts were her social security
payments and which portion of such funds were Alva's social security payment. Def.'s Ex. BB. And, these two
sources of separate income were not so inextricably intertwined that they were co-mingled. Under Idaho law, the
commingling of separate personal property of one spouse with the separate property of the other spouse and/or with
community property does not convert the separate personal property into community personal property unless "it is
impossible to trace the source of the funds." Stahl v. Stahl, 91 Idaho 794, 797, 430 P.2d 686,689 (1967), quoting
Thomasset v. Thomasset, 122 Cal. App. 2d 116,264 P.2d 626, 631 (1953) (emphasis in original). "So long as the
separate property of either spouse is identifiable and traceable, commingling of such separate property with
community property does not convert the separate property into community property." Jd Indeed, to the extent that
the lender might have relied on Thelma's social security income as a potential source of repayment, the lender
would have been relying on a separate property asset, not a community property asset. The lender looking to
Thelma's separate property income as a potential source of repayment does not support the characterization of the
Middleton Place as community property.
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delivered as of the date of the deed. In order to overcome these presumptions, Thelma was
required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Alva retained dominion or control over
the deed when he delivered it to a third-party, thereby making delivery invalid. That is to say,
Thelma was required to prove that at the time Alva gave the 2006 Quitclaim Deed to John, Alva
reserved the right to have the deed returned to him, ifhe requested it. App. Br. at 23-24.
In his opening brief, Jack detailed Idaho case law regarding the correct legal standard for
proving that delivery was invalid:
Delivery is effective if a deed is given to a third party with
instructions to deliver to the grantee after the death of the grantor.
Cell v. Drake, 61 Idaho 299, 303, 100 P.2d 949, 950 (1940) (citing
Showalter v. Spangle, 93 Wash. 326, 160 P. 1042 (1916); Martin v.
Flaharty, 13 Mont. 96, 32 P. 287 (1893)). It is well recognized
that delivery to a third party with such instructions "constitutes a
present passage of title with a reservation of a life estate in the
grantor." Id To prove delivery to a third party was invalid, the
party challenging delivery must show that at the time the deed
was delivered into escrow, the grantor retained some dominion
over the third party to request the return of the deed. Estate
of Lewis, 97 Idaho 299, 302, 543 P.2d 852, 855 (1975) (noting that
the "question of intent as of the time the deed was given [into
escrow] is the controlling question).
App. Br. at 25 (emphasis added). Thelma did not attempt to refute, rebut, or distinguish this well
settled authority.

Rather, Thelma misinterpreted this argument and authority, attempting to

recharacterize the issue on appeal as one of circumstantial vs. direct evidence. See, generally,
Resp. Br. at 19. That re-characterization misses the issues presented on this appeal.
Jack's appeal cites error by the District Court in (i) placing the burden of proof on him
and (ii) then applying the incorrect legal standard. Although the District Court found that Alva
instructed John to record the deed after Alva's death,

(~27),

to prove that Alva "completely divested himself of title"
standard.
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the court placed the burden on Jack
(~

29). That is the incorrect legal

The correct legal standard is to place the burden on Thelma to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that Alva retained dominion or control over the deed at the time he
deposited it into escrow with John.8 See In re Estate of Lewis, 97 Idaho 299,302,543 P.2d 852,
855 (1975) (noting that the "question of intent as of the time the deed was given [into escrow]" is
the controlling question).

Accordingly, Jack respectfully requests that this Court apply the

uncontroverted findings to the correct legal standard: whether Alva retained dominion or control
over the deed.

2.

The District Court's decision must be reversed because all of the
findings support a conclusion that the 2006 Quitclaim Deed was
validly delivered.

In his opening brief, Jack argued that the findings were not inconsistent with the legal
conclusion of valid delivery. App. Bf. at 24 - 27. In response, Thelma argued that all of these
facts were uncontroverted and, further, that circumstantial evidence was competent evidence.
Resp. Br. at 19-20. Jack agrees that circumstantial evidence is competent evidence and the facts
were uncontroverted.

However, even if evidence is circumstantial and uncontroverted, the

findings must still be applied to the correct legal standard. Because the findings are consistent
with the legal conclusion that the 2006 Quitclaim Deed was validly delivered, they cannot-as a
matter of law-also support the conclusion that the 2006 Quitclaim Deed was not validly
delivered.
As noted in Jack's opening brief, at both summary judgment and trial, Thelma failed to
present any evidence that Alva retained dominion or control over the deed at the time he placed
8 Thelma argues that it was not possible for her to obtain direct evidence of the escrow instructions given to John
because she was unaware of the existence of the deed until after Alva's death. Resp. Br. at 19. Thelma's alleged
lack of knowledge at the time Alva delivered the deed into escrow does not excuse Thelma from her evidentiary
burdens. John submitted an affidavit at the summary judgment stage testifying that the only instruction he received
from Alva was not to have the deed recorded until after Alva's death. R. Vol. II, p. 223, 1111. Thelma did not take
John's deposition during discovery, nor did she call John as a witness at trial. Accordingly, the only evidence is that
Alva did not give John any limiting instructions that would support the legal conclusion that Alva retained dominion
or control over the 2006 Quitclaim Deed when he delivered it into escrow.
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it into escrow. Because this is the correct legal standard for detennining whether delivery to a
third party is valid, Cell v. Drake, 61 Idaho 299, 100 P.2d 949 (1940), the absence of evidence on
the point is fatal to Thelma's claim. Tellingly, during closing argument, Thelma's counsel
admitted that there was little to no evidence presented on the issue of delivery: "I don't know
how much evidence [Thelma] actually presented to the court on the issue of delivery." Tr. p.
436, L. 10-12. Because Thelma had the burden to prove ineffective delivery by clear and
convincing evidence, her counsel's concession that she had not presented evidence on the issue
of delivery is a very strong indication that she failed to meet her burden.
Here, all of the findings support the legal conclusion that there was valid delivery of the
2006 Quitclaim Deed during Alva's lifetime. It is undisputed and uncontroverted that Alva
delivered the deed to John with instructions to have it recorded after Alva's death.

(~27).

Based

on nearly identical facts, this Court concluded delivery was valid:
[T]he positive instruction given to [the third party], to keep the
deed in his safe until after [grantor's] death, and to deliver it to
[grantee] after [grantor's] death, precludes any intention, either
express or implied, that [grantor] reserved the right or privilege of
recalling the deed at any time prior to her death; and of course she
The instruction is plain and
could not do so afterward.
unambiguous.
Under a well recognized line of authorities in this country, a deed
to real property may be executed and placed in the hands of a
depositary or escrow holder for delivery to the grantee after the
death of the grantor, and constitutes a present passage of title
with a reservation of a life estate in the grantor.
Cell, 61 Idaho at 303, 100 P.2d at 950 (italics in original) (bold and underlining added).

Applying the uncontroverted facts to this well settled authority: Alva's delivery of the
2006 Quitclaim Deed to John constitutes valid delivery as a matter of law, unless there is
sufficient evidence that Alva retained dominion or control over the deed. See id The findings
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that Jack was not aware of the deed initially, (~ 30.5), and never took physical possession of the
deed,

(~

30.6), are not proof that Alva retained dominion or control over the deed. Therefore,

these findings are irrelevant.
Under Cell, Alva's instruction that John not record the deed until after Alva's death
"precludes any intention, either express or implied, that [Alva] reserved the right or privilege of
recalling the deed at any time prior to [Alva's] death." See Cell, 61 Idaho at 303, 100 P.2d at
950. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Alva did not retain dominion or control over the deed.
The findings that Alva did not want the deed recorded until after his death,

(~

30.1), and that

John--consistent with these wishes and instructions--did not record the deed until after Alva's
death,

(~

31), are not proof that Alva retained dominion or control over the deed.

Rather, these

findings show that John, as an escrow agent, followed the escrow instructions. Accordingly,
these findings are entirely consistent with a conclusion of valid delivery.
Under Cell, Alva's instruction that John not record the deed until after Alva's death also
"constitutes a present passage of title [to Jack] with a reservation of a life estate in [Alva]." See

Cell, 61 Idaho at 303, 100 P.2d at 950. This authority is found throughout Idaho law: "[I]t is not
... inconsistent with the passage of a present title, particularly in a father-son relationship, that
the incidents of management be retained by a grantor." Hartley v. Stibor, 96 Idaho 157, 160,525
P.2d 352, 355 (1974) (citation omitted); see also In re Estate a/Courtright, 99 Idaho 575, 57780, 586 P.2d 265, 267-70 (1978). Accordingly, the findings that Jack did not take possession of
the property after Alva executed the quitclaim deed,
30.3), Alva continued to accept rent,

(~

(~

30.4), and Jack did not accept rent,

that Alva retained dominion or control over the deed.
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30.2), Jack continued to pay rent,
(~30.8),

(~

do not prove

Rather, these findings are entirely

consistent with the passage of present title to Jack with a reservation of a life estate by Alva.
Thus, these findings are entirely consistent with a conclusion of valid delivery.

In short, not a single finding proves that Alva retained dominion and control over the
deed-the proposition that Thelma was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence in
order to establish that delivery was invalid. Because the findings are consistent with present
passage of title to Jack with a reservation of a life estate in Alva, this Court may rely on the
findings to conclude as a matter of law that there was valid delivery during Alva's lifetime.
IV.

. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Jack respectfully requests that this Court reverse the decision
of the District Court with instructions to enter an order holding that Alva and Thelma held their
respective tenants in common interests in the Middleton Place as separate property and that Alva
conveyed his separate property interest to his son, Jack. Jack further requests that this Court
instruct the District Court to enter an order granting Jack's prayer for partition of the Middleton
Place.
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